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ABSTRACT
An unmeritorious lawsuit leaves one sprinting for the door. Being
locked in dispute resolution for years against a frivolous claim causes
unnecessary expense, inconvenience, and frustration. Civil procedure
rules provide an exit through summary judgment or dismissal. Yet, what
if there were no escape? Indeed, the best way out is not always through.
International arbitration has no clear mechanism for summary disposal
of unmeritorious claims and may be a trap for parties believing arbitra-
tion to be the more economical form of resolution.
This article analyzes the potential sources of arbitrators' authority
to dispose summarily of a case on the merits prior to a final hearing and
then assesses the obstacles that block the application of summary dispo-
sition. This article then addresses the current state of uncertainty on the
subject and lastly offers a solution.
* J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to express my
gratitude to Professor John Rooney for his guidance with this article and to the rest of the
outstanding international arbitration faculty at the University of Miami.
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"By good rights I ought not to have so much
Put on me, but there seems no other way.
Len says one steady pull more ought to do it.
He says the best way out is always through.
And I agree to that, or in so far
As that I can see no way out but through-"1
I. GROUNDWORK: SUMMARY DISPOSITION DEFINED
Summary disposition is a decision on the merits made before a final
hearing, much like summary judgment or dismissal in common law liti-
gation.2 It involves a decision on the merits without a complete explora-
tion of all possible evidence.' Rather, the arbitrator' makes his or her
decision referring to the pleadings and other documents produced at the
initial stage.'
Summary disposition comes in two forms: that of particular claims
or that of the entire case. Arbitrator authority to dispose summarily of
particular claims is largely undisputed. Accordingly, this article
addresses summary disposition of the entire dispute.
II. THE MILLION-DOLLAR QUESTION: LAW APPLICABLE IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
This article speaks to summary disposition in international,6 rather
than domestic, arbitration because most countries have distinct mecha-
nisms for summary disposition. By contrast, in international arbitration
numerous laws, rules, and treaties apply, creating layers of complexity.
First, arbitration is a creature of contract and thus the parties' agree-
1. ROBERT FROST, A Servant to Servants, NORTH OF BOSTON 66 (Henry Holt and Co., 1914).
2. Summary judgment, dismissal, "claim-vetting," and "strike out" applications are
generally related procedures dealing with early disposition of issues or claims. They are more
prevalent in common law traditions. See Aren Goldsmith, Trans-]Global Petroleum: "Rare Bird"
or Significant Step in the Development of Early Merits-]Based Claim-]Vetting?, 26 A.S.A. BULL.
667, 667 (2008); D. Brian King & Jeffery P. Commission, Summary Judgment in International
Arbitration: The "Nay" Case, 4 (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Am. Bar
Ass'n Section of Int'l Law), available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/spring20l0/materials/
Common%20Law%2OSummary%20Judgment%20in%20International%20Arbitration/King%20-
%20Commission.pdf).
3. Judith Gill, Applications for the Early Disposition of Claims in Arbitration Proceedings,
in 14, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES (SPECIAL ISSUE THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AT 50) 515 (Albert
Jan van den Berg ed., 2009).
4. Reference to a singular arbitrator also means the plural, tribunal.
5. See Gill, supra note 3, at 14.
6. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on International
Arbitration defines an arbitration proceeding as international if the parties have their places of
business in different states or if the seat or location of the dispute lies outside the place where both
parties conduct business. Model Law on Int'l Com. Arb., U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17,
U.N. Doc. A/40/17, at art. 1(3) (Dec. 11, 1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].
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ment is primary, short of public policy violations.' Party autonomy is a
pillar of arbitration that allows the parties to define their own proce-
dure.' As such, the arbitration typically begins with an initial conference
to agree on a procedure.' Summary disposition is a measure that, by its
nature, arises immediately. However, in almost all cases, parties make
no express reference to summary disposition in their agreement.
Second, the parties may adopt procedural rules, typically in con-
junction with the appointment of an arbitral institution to administer the
dispute."o These rules, deemed to be adopted as part of the arbitration
agreement, guide the arbitrators as to the procedural intentions of the
parties.'" Almost no institutional rules address summary disposition, and
therefore application by these means is unlikely. The institution may
also have a history of published awards that can be persuasive as to
general principles.' 2
National law regulates arbitration at the seat, i.e., the chosen loca-
tion of the proceedings." The United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") drafted a Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration ("UNCITRAL Model Law") in an effort to pro-
mote uniformity across different jurisdictions.14 The UNCITRAL Model
Law represents a consensus on key aspects of international arbitration
practice." More than seventy jurisdictions, including several states
within the United States, have adopted some version of the UNCITRAL
Model Law.16
Lastly, by its nature, international arbitration involves international
parties or transactions." Parties seek the enforcement of the final award
in the jurisdiction holding the opposing party's assets or seek to set aside
7. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, arts. II
and V(2)(b) June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
8. NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES wrrH ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN
HUNTER, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 365 (5th ed. 2009).
9. JAN PAULSSON & GEORGIOS PETROCHILos, REVISIONS OF THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION
RULES: A REPORT 66 n. 130 (2006); INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION, art.
24(1) (2012) [hereinafter ICC RULES].
10. Appointment of an institution may occur either through specification in the parties'
agreement or by consent of both parties through a special submission after the dispute has arisen.
BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 8, at 86.
11. Id. at 55. For more on institutional rules, see infra Part V.A.
12. For, example, ICSID and Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce
regularly publish awards.
13. The seat or situs is the arbitration's location as chosen by the parties and is typically
where the hearing is held.
14. G.A. Res. 61/33, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/33, at 1 (Dec. 18, 2006).
15. Id.
16. Status of the UNCITRAL Model Law, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/
arbitration/1985Model-arbitrationstatus.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
17. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 6, at art. 1(3).
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the award at the arbitral seat. The respective laws of these jurisdictions
govern enforcement or set aside.' 8
III. BENEFITS OF SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Summary disposition means faster resolution of the dispute and
lower costs and related expenses. If a court can resolve a case through
summary judgment within weeks, there is no logic to enduring years of
arbitration without the same remedy for equally meritless cases. Why
should a hopeless claim be allowed to drag on simply because the parties
inserted an arbitration clause?" The arbitration clause, possibly adopted
to save time in dispute resolution, binds them to arbitrate rather than
litigate.20
If the resolution process extends unnecessarily over several years,
users will be left unsatisfied and quite possibly penniless. As the mantra
goes "Justice delayed is justice denied."2 1 Delays and costs brought by
failing to use early disposition evidences a serious deficiency in arbitra-
tion as a dispute resolution mechanism. 22 Inability to achieve speedy
resolution signifies for some the failure of arbitration itself.23
IV. WHAT GOES UP: DISADVANTAGES .
Of course, summary disposition has shortcomings. The arbitrator's
authority originates from parties' agreement; the agreement must guide
the arbitrator's procedural decisions. Summary disposition in interna-
tional arbitration is certainly not the norm, but rather the exception. 2 4 So
when users insert an arbitration clause, they generally expect to be heard
in a final hearing as a matter of custom. The arbitrators must consider
this unspoken expectation when determining whether to apply summary
disposition.
Parties also expect to work through complex matters fully with the
arbitrators, whom they may have selected for his or her specialized
knowledge on the subject.25 A hearing allows for the development of
evidence, the presentation of legal arguments, an opportunity to discuss
those arguments. If an arbitrator were to halt the process at an early
18. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 8, at 585.
19. See Gill, supra note 3, at 520; Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex Int'l, Inc. v.
Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/11 1 34 (Dec. 1, 2010).
20. New York Convention, supra note 7, at art. H.
21. See Case No. 10947 of 2002, Interim Award, 22 A.S.A BULL. 330 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.);
BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 8, at 334.
22. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 8, at 334.
23. Gill, supra note 3, at 520.
24. See infra Part VI.
25. Gill, supra note 3, at 515.
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stage, the losing party would naturally feel dissatisfied and skeptical
toward the process. Also, arbitrators may be uncomfortable disposing of
a case without sufficient time to become familiar with it and rightly so.2 6
Less time in deliberation means a higher risk of a poorly reasoned
decision.
Arbitration laws typically require that each party have an opportu-
nity to present its case.27 Award enforcement is problematic if the court
concludes that an early decision denied a party the opportunity to pre-
sent its case. This issue is elaborated in Part VI(A).
Further, arbitral awards are non-appealable so a party left unsatis-
fied with a summary disposition has no right to a review, 28 except the
limited review of the enforcing court. The finality of summary disposi-
tion may be difficult to handle, especially when dealing with a complex,
high-dollar dispute that requires meticulous consideration." The conse-
quences of summary disposition in international arbitration are therefore
more serious and arbitrators will be more reluctant to apply it.
Common law summary judgment ensures effective management of
judicial resources. National courts must streamline an overwhelming
caseload and ensure proper application of government funds.o This jus-
tification does not translate to arbitration." Parties pay arbitrators to deal
with their dispute in a personalized way3 2 and institutional rules often
require that the arbitrators certify that they have adequate time to dedi-
cate to the case.3
Lastly, much like its judicial counterpart, summary disposition in
arbitration may not always have the intended effect. Recalcitrant parties
can use requests for disposition to delay the process. It is simply another
layer of time and cost to make bringing a claim more troublesome.34
26. King, supra note 2, at 4. For example, in an unpublished insurance arbitration in London,
the claimant sought summary disposition after the initial exchange of pleadings. The respondent
claimed that it would be procedurally unfair to decide before hearing all evidence. The tribunal
agreed with respondent, despite claimant's suggestion that all evidence be viewed in respondent's
favor. This example "demonstrates a certain mindset, which practitioners need to overcome." Gill,
supra note 3, at 523.
27. See e.g., New York Convention, supra note 7, at art. V(1)(b); UNCITRAL Model Law,
supra note 6, at art. 18; English Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 33, § (1)(a); LoI FtDtRALE SUR LE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVt [RS] Dec. 18, 1987, RS 291, art. 190(2)(d) (Switz.); Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
28. King, supra note 2, at 4.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Gill, supra note 3, at 515.
32. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 8, at 364.
33. Id.
34. King, supra note 2, at 4; MATTI S. KURKELA ET AL., DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 192 (2d ed. 2010).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
V. AUTHORITY FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Arbitrators and parties alike remain uncertain as to whether sum-
mary disposition is appropriate because there is a lack of legal gui-
dance.35 In a debate on whether arbitrators have authority to grant
summary disposition, scholars Jan Paulsson and Albert Jan van den Berg
disagreed.3 6 Paulsson argued that there is no debate at all, citing the
express authority in the International Centre for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes ("ICSID") Rules." On the other hand, van den Berg
argued that examination of other institutional rules would reveal no sim-
ilar authority.38
a. Institutional Rules
Institutional rules govern procedures such as the constitution of the
tribunal, allocation of costs, and issuance of awards. The rules establish
a comprehensive procedure for managing the arbitration." If the rules
require hearings, the arbitrators or court should not mandate document-
based disposition.
No institutional rules grant express authority for summary disposi-
tion, but many provide that the arbitrator must to manage the case effi-
ciently, suggesting a duty to dispose of an unmeritorious case in advance
of the final hearing.4 0 Most rules also grant broad authority to the arbi-
trator to decide procedure, providing power to decide summarily within
the bounds of the agreement."
Some major institutions that leave the issue open include the Inter-
national Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce
("ICC"), the London Court of International Arbitration ("LCIA"), and
the American Arbitration Association ("AAA").
The ICC Task Force for Arbitrating Competition Issues contem-
plated a summary disposition mechanism, but concluded that "a sum-
mary judgment vehicle would not work in the ICC context and
35. This point is exacerbated by the fact that in international arbitration many layers of
treaties, laws, and rules apply. See infra Part. II.
36. Prof. Jan Paulsson, Co-head Int'l Arb. Grp., Freshfields Brukhaus Derringer, LLP &
Prof. Albert Jan van den Berg, Partner, Hanotiau & van den Berg, Debate on The Life of a Young
Arb. Lawyer in Miami: Arb. Inside and Out (Nov. 6 2010) [hereinafter Future of Arb.: Miami!
Debate].
37. Id.; see International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention,
Regulations and Rules, Apr. 2006, ICSID/15, art. 41(5) [hereinafter ICSID Rules]; see infra Part
V.A.
38. Future of Arb.: Miami! Debate, supra note 36.
39. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 8, at 55.
40. Gill, supra note 3, at 520; King, supra note 2, at 2.
41. Gill, supra note 3, at 520.
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culture."42 Institutions must adapt their rules for parties from a wide
variety of legal systems so the Task Force therefore discouraged includ-
ing a rule for summary disposition.43
The 2012 ICC Rules of Arbitration nevertheless make substantial
steps in improving efficiency and lowering costs for users by imple-
menting case management rules. The tribunal and parties must make
"every effort to conduct the arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effec-
tive manner" having regard to the complexity of the case" and a case
management conference at the outset is required.45 The case manage-
ment conference allows the tribunal and the parties to consider procedu-
ral measures like summary disposition in the initial stages. The Rules
further allow the tribunal to decide the case solely on the documents
unless any party requests a hearing, making hearings less of a default
rule than in the past.4 6 Finally, when assessing the costs, the tribunal
may consider the extent to which each party has conducted the arbitra-
tion in an expeditious, cost-effective manner.' The steps the ICC has
taken are substantial in reducing time and costs of arbitration to the ben-
efit of the ultimate users.
Similarly, the LCIA Rules contain no direct provision for summary
disposition but insist on prompt resolution. Arbitrators must "adopt pro-
cedures suitable to the circumstances of the arbitration, avoiding unnec-
essary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair and efficient means for
the final resolution of the parties' dispute."48 Moreover, the tribunal has
the "widest discretion" in conducting the proceedings under the law as
the "tribunal may determine to be applicable."4 9
The AAA Rules grant the arbitrator much broader authority to
decide a case summarily, giving discretion to "exclude cumulative or
irrelevant testimony or other evidence and direct the parties to focus
their presentations on issues the decision of which could dispose of all or
part of the case."50 This Rule highlights the need for a swift and efficient
resolution and grants authority to reach a conclusion by whatever means
42. Id., at 524.
43. Id.
44. ICC RULES, supra note 9, art. 22(1) (emphasis added).
45. Id. at art. 24(1).
46. Id. at art. 25(6).
47. Id. at art. 37(5). Other case management provisions like deadlines to submit the Terms of
Reference and notification to the institution and parties when the award will be issued further urge
efficiency and cost-saving in the 2012 ICC Rules.
48. LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARBTrRATION, ARBrrRATION RULES, art. 14.1 (1998) [hereinafter
LCIA Rules].
49. Id. at art. 14.2; King, supra note 2, at 2 n.8.
50. AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, at art. 16.3 (2009)
[hereinafter AAA RULES]; King, supra note 2, at 2 n.7.
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appropriate. Unfortunately, no published cases are available to elaborate
on this rule.
Only the ICSID Rules, which apply to investor-state arbitrations,
expressly allow summary disposition. ICSID adopted the Rules in 2006
in response to criticism regarding the absence of a procedure to screen
patently unmeritorious claims brought against respondent govern-
ments," with the obvious policy reasons being the avoidance of exces-
sive depletion of state resources. The Rules allow a party to "file an
objection that a claim is manifestly without legal merit"5 2 and if "all
claims are manifestly without legal merit," the tribunal shall render an
award accordingly. 3
Few decisions have applied the Rule. The first occurred in Trans-
Global Petroleum, Inc. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.54 The tri-
bunal consulted various texts to decipher the appropriate interpretation
of the broad phrase "manifestly without legal merit" in application to
Trans-Global Petroleum's claims. It denied the respondent's request to
dismiss the case under Rule 41(5), but the analysis did prompt the claim-
ant to withdraw one of its three claims under the strict analysis.5 6
The second decision, Brandes Investment Partners, LP v. Vene-
zuela, came to a similar result. The respondent asserted a jurisdictional
defense that the claimant was not an "investor" as defined in the Vene-
zuela-US bilateral investment treaty ("BIT") and therefore the claims
were manifestly without legal merit.58 The tribunal concluded that the
Rule covered jurisdiction and competence defenses" and ultimately
rejected the request because it involved consideration of "complex legal
and factual issues" incapable of summary resolution.6 0
51. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 668.
52. ICSID Rules, supra note 37, at art. 41(5). Rule 41(5) states the following:
Unless the parties have agreed to another expedited procedure for making
preliminary objections, a party may, no later than 30 days after the constitution of
the Tribunal, and in any event before the first session of the Tribunal, file an
objection that a claim is manifestly without legal merit. The party shall specify as
precisely as possible the basis for the objection. The Tribunal, after giving the
parties the opportunity to present their observations on the objection, shall, at its
first session or promptly thereafter, notify the parties of its decision on the
objection.
53. ICSID Rules, supra note 37, at art. 41(6); Gill, supra note 3, at 516.
54. Trans-]Global Petroleum, Inc. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/25 (May 12, 2008).
55. Id. JR 83-105.
56. Id. 119.
57. Brandes Investment Partners, LP v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/3 (Feb. 2, 2009).
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Only two ICSID decisions, published within weeks of each other,
have granted summary disposition. The first was Global Trading
Resource Corp. and Globex International, Inc. v. Ukraine."1 Much like
Brandes, the respondent asserted a jurisdictional defense that the agree-
ment for the sale of poultry products was not an "investment" as defined
by the Ukraine-US BIT.62 The tribunal recognized the novelty of the
dismissal and was "particularly conscious of its responsibility to contrib-
ute to shaping both an understanding of the Rule itself and of the proce-
dure which ought to be followed under it."6 It also noted the importance
of allowing the claimant a "proper opportunity to be heard, both in writ-
ing and orally" and recognized an obligation to consider all of the rele-
vant materials before reaching a decision.64
The Global Trading tribunal ultimately dismissed the claim
because there was nothing else that could possibly be submitted to shape
the legal argument or the evidence.6 5 The Global Trading decision is
unsatisfactory because, in reality, it took multiple rounds of written sub-
missions and two oral hearings to conclude.66 The tribunal recognized
that in some cases a clear conclusion may be reached on written submis-
sions alone, but "they will be rare."6 7 Document-based decisions would
also tend toward rejection, given that the objection may be resurrected
after a full argument.68
RSM Production Corporation and others v. Grenada'9 also
involved a summary dismissal. The claimant's contractual claims had
already been rejected in previous proceedings, but the claimant argued
that the Grenada-US BIT provided an independent source of rights,
allowing it to bring the same claims under the BIT.70 Grenada demanded
a dismissal, arguing that the claims were precluded by previous findings
and therefore manifestly without legal merit." Recognizing the serious-
ness of a dismissal, the tribunal decided to construe the claimant's
claims liberally and resolve any uncertainties in favor of the claimant.72
Ultimately, however, the tribunal found the conclusions of the previous
61. Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex Int'l, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/
09/11 (Dec. 1, 2010).
62. Id. at 31.
63. Id. at 29.
64. Id. at 1 33.
65. Id. at 134.
66. Id. at 33.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Rachel S. Grynberg, Stephen M. Grynberg, Miriam Z. Grynberg, and RSM Prod. Corp. v.
Grenada, ISCID Case No. ARB/10/6 (Dec. 10, 2010).
70. Id. at 1 6.1.3.
71. Id. at 4.6.7.
72. Id. at 6.1.3.
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ICSID tribunal had bound the claimant and it dismissed the case.
Unlike the Global Trading tribunal,7 4 the RSM tribunal assessed all costs
and fees to the claimant for advancing its unmeritorious claims again in
new proceedings.7 1 Similar to Global, however, RSM held an oral hear-
ing to reach this decision.76
While the dismissals in Global Trading and RSM cases saved the
tribunals from delving into all of the merits of the case, they still
involved substantial time, preparation, and oral arguments to reach a
conclusion. If the tribunals had denied the objection, those submissions
and hearings would have been a massive waste of time and resources.
Though these cases encourage the use of dismissals and help to set a
standard for Rule 41(5), they also continue the trend to hold hearings
even for the most unfounded claims.
b. National Law
In addition to institutional rules, national arbitration law may also
provide legal support for summary disposition. National law applies
upon a party's attempt to enforce, set aside, or recognize an award in
court.
UNCITRAL Model Law jurisdictions apply the UNCITRAL Rules
by default if the parties have not agreed otherwise. The 2010 Rules pro-
vide that unless any party requests otherwise, the arbitrator "shall decide
whether to hold such hearings or whether the proceedings shall be con-
ducted on the basis of documents and other materials."77 However,
because the parties must consent to document-based resolution after the
dispute has arisen, this measure unlikely to be applied.
Some national courts, like those in the United States, accord broad
deference to the arbitrator in his or her procedural decisions.7 1 U.S.
courts have had little difficulty finding that arbitrators may grant sum-
mary disposition, 0 reasoning, for example, that "no one has the right to
73. Id. at T 7.2.1.
74. Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex Int'l, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/
09/11 59 (Dec. 1, 2010) (finding that given the newness of the procedure, the "appropriate
outcome is for the costs of the procedure to lie where they fall.").
75. RSM, ARB/10/6 at 1 8.3.4.
76. Id. at 1.3.6.
77. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc. AIRES/65/465 at art. 17.3
(Dec. 6, 2010) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules]; Gill, supra note 3, at 521; King, supra note 2, at 3
n.10.
78. See supra Part II; see Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 684.
79. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2578-79, 2579 (2009); see,
e.g., Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 749 (8th Cir. 1986); see also United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Ideal Cement Co., 762 F.2d 837, 841 (10th Cir. 1985) (greater deference
to arbitrators on procedural issues).
80. Michael M. Collins, Summary Disposition in International Arbitration, in 14, ICCA
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force a tribunal to hear irrelevant evidence that cannot save an otherwise
hopeless claim."s"
Similarly, English law utilizes the "strike out" rule which addresses
the facial validity of a claim similar to a motion to dismiss in the United
States.8 2 Scholars and case law suggest that arbitrators likely have
authority to decide summarily under English law, but the law is unclear.
Stephen Netherway opines that "there is no reason why arbitrators, if
empowered to determine their own procedures cannot agree to hear an
application for summary judgment."" In one case, the English Court of
Appeal upheld a Swiss ICC award where the arbitrator refused to hear
oral evidence, stating that "where both parties have had more than ample
opportunity to present and argue the case, . . . it was completely unnec-
essary to collect testimonies and hear witnesses." 84 The court concluded
that "the arbitrator is under no obligation to allow a party to lead evi-
dence when . . . he has come to the conclusion, that . .. this is entirely
unnecessary."8 5
French courts also give broad procedural latitude to arbitrators."
Measures such as hearing witnesses, calling a hearing, or entertaining
oral arguments in arbitration are viewed with less necessity and, accord-
ingly, arbitrators may refuse to utilize such procedures." If an arbitrator
deems a claim to be facially invalid "no matter the volume of evidence,
. .. a tribunal's decision to dismiss that claim ... should in principle
represent a valid exercise of procedural discretion under French curial
law.""
CONGRESS SERIES (SPEcIAL IssuE THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AT 50) 532, (Albert Jan van den
Berg ed., 2009).
81. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 682-83; see also Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1207
(10th Cir. 2001) ("[I]f a party's claims are facially deficient and the party therefore has no relevant
or material evidence to present at an evidentiary hearing, the arbitration panel has full authority to
dismiss the claims without permitting discovery or holding an evidentiary hearing.").
82. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 683.
83. Stephen Netherway, The Arbitration Act 1996 And Its Potential Impact On Insurance And
Reinsurance Dispute Resolution, 5 INT. I.L.R. 276, 280 (1997).
84. Dalmia Dairy Indus. Ltd. v. Nat'l Bank of Pakistan, [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 223 at 269-70
(Eng.).
85. See id. at 223, 269.
86. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 684.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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VI. FEAR TO APPLY: WHY AVOID SUMMARY DISPOSITION
WHEN THERE IS EVIDENT AUTHORITY?
Based on broad authority in institutional rules and a general defer-
ence of courts to arbitrators in regard to procedure, it would seem that
arbitrators have the necessary tools to apply summary disposition. It is
curious then why summary disposition is not used more regularly.
The primary obstacle is possible impairment of a party's right to
present its case. If an arbitrator dismisses a case before a party is fully
heard, a reviewing court may find that procedural fairness, known as due
process in some jurisdictions," has been violated.9 0
a. Fair Play: Law Requiring Procedural Fairness
Most treaties, national laws, and institutional rules on international
arbitration contain provisions mandating some measure of procedural
fairness. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"), perhaps the most
important legal instrument in international arbitration, requires the
courts of signatory countries to enforce foreign arbitral awards, except
under limited exceptions.9 1 One of those exceptions is where a party was
"unable to present his case".9 2 This provision of the Convention, which
also requires notification to all parties of the initiation of proceedings,
has been referred to as the due process rule of international arbitration.9 3
Most national arbitration laws, including the UNCITRAL Model
Law, the Federal Arbitration Act of the United States ("FAA"), the
English Arbitration Act, and the Swiss Law on Private International
Arbitration, also require examination of the award for procedural fair-
ness before its enforcement.
The UNCITRAL Model Law provides that "each party shall be
89. Debate exists as to the proper terminology. Some use the term "due process." See, e.g.,
KURKELA, supra note 34, at 189; PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONs 18 (2000). Others coin the term "natural justice." See,
e.g., Gill, supra note 3, at 520, 522. Procedural fairness should be distinguished from "due
process," to avoid implying that the same domestic standards apply to international awards. BORN,
supra note 79, at 2576.
90. BORN, supra note 79, at 2576; King, supra note 2, at 4.
91. New York Convention, supra note 7, at arts. III & V. This is unlike typical practice where
a court may choose whether it will enforce a foreign court's judgment. The New York
Convention, in contrast, requires that its signatories' courts enforce foreign arbitral awards, except
under limited exceptions. Id. at art. V.
92. Id. at art. V(1)(b); see also Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, art. 5(l)(b), Jan. 30, 1975, 104 Stat. 448, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42; European Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration, art. IX(l)(b), Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364.
93. BINDER, supra note 89, at 34; see also BORN, supra note 79, at 2573; HOWARD M.
HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 915 (1989).
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given a full opportunity of presenting his case."94 If an arbitrator violates
this provision, the award may be set aside."
The English Arbitration Act requires that the arbitrator "giv[e] each
party a reasonable opportunity of putting forward his case and dealing
with that of his opponent."9 6 The Swiss Law on Private International
Law recognizes the parties' "right to be heard in adversarial proce-
dure."" The FAA states that an award may be set aside if the tribunal
refused to hear evidence "pertinent and material" to the controversy."
Under the FAA, if an arbitrator decides a case before hearing witness
testimony or expert opinions, a party may argue that the arbitrator
neglected to consider relevant substantive information. National provi-
sions vary, but each uniformly requires that parties be given an equal
chance to present their respective cases. Though the arbitrators may
decide procedure, courts will nonetheless review an award for procedu-
ral fairness.99
Institutional rules also provide for procedural fairness. The UNCI-
TRAL Arbitration Rules grant discretion to the tribunal to decide proce-
dure, so long as "each party is given a full opportunity of presenting his
case."oo Likewise, AAA Rules mandate that "the parties are treated
with equality and that each party has the right to be heard and is given a
fair opportunity to present its case." 01
The ICC and LCIA Rules limit presentation to only a reasonable
opportunity.10 2 LCIA Rules also state that "parties shall do everything
necessary for the fair, efficient and expedited conduct of the arbitra-
tion," 103 further limiting the parties in the presentation of their cases.
b. Procedural Fairness Defined
Debate exists as to whether procedural fairness mandates an oral
94. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 6, at art. 18 (emphasis added); Gill, supra note 3, at
520. This provision, which also requires equal treatment of the parties, has been called the
"Magna Carta of arbitral procedure." KURKELA, supra note 34, at 187; BINDER, supra note 89, at
122.
95. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 6, at art. 34(2)(a)(ii); BINDER, supra note 89, at 124;
BoRN, supra note 79, at 2572.
96. English Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 33, § (1)(a).
97. LoI FtDtRALE SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE [RS] Dec. 18, 1987, RS 291, art.
190(2)(d) (Switz.).
98. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
99. BoRN, supra note 79, at 2579.
100. UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 77, at art. 15.1 (emphasis added); see also Gill, supra note
3, at 519.
101. AAA RULES, supra note 50, at art. 16.1 (emphasis added).
102. LCIA RULES, supra note 48, at art. 14.1; ICC RULES, supra note 9, at art. 22.4.
103. LCIA RULES, supra note 48, at art. 14.2.
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hearing or whether a party's case may be fully presented in written sub-
missions alone.
1. FAIRNESS IN ORAL HEARINGS
Some scholars assert that there is a "presumptive right to an oral
evidentiary hearing,"" which has been called "the most fundamental
rule of due process and ordre public."' If users want a personalized
resolution process suitable to their needs,106 it may follow that the par-
ties' right to be "heard" includes an oral hearing.10 7 Scholar Gary Born
calls an arbitrator's refusal to conduct a hearing a "classic instance of
denial of a party's opportunity to be heard."'os Many consider such
opportunity to be heard orally as a mandatory procedural guarantee.109
For example, the Uniform Arbitration Act, adopted by many U.S. states,
makes a hearing a right that the parties may waive only by mutual
agreement. "0
After all, the ideal is that "the two parties both present their case"
and are encouraged to "bring all the relevant evidence which supports
their position before the impartial arbitrator, who may intervene in the
proceedings when necessary."' In this way, the parties ensure that the
arbitrator finds a proper balance after hearing all the evidence."12 Addi-
tionally, if the parties feel they have exhausted all disputes at once, they
are less likely to return with further issues."'
2. FAIRNESS IN WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ALONE
However, the boundary of procedural fairness may stop, as some
contend, at the opportunity to submit written arguments and respond to
the opposing party's submissions.1 14 In jurisdictions like the United
104. King, supra note 2, at 4; Howard M. Holtzmann, Report on U.S. Arbitration Law, INT'L
HANDBOOK COM. ARB., Sept. 1992, at 1, 19 ("[I]t is generally recognized to be a fundamental
right which should not be denied.").
105. KURKELA, supra note 34, at 189. Ordre public is loosely translated as public policy.
106. Gill, supra note 3, at 515.
107. BORN, supra note 79, at 2580; MATTI S. KURKELA ET AL., DUE PROCESS IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 183-85 (2005).
108. BORN, supra note 79, at 2580; see Cour d'appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Paris, Jan. 19,
1990, Rev. arb. 1991, 125 (Fr.); Guandong Overseas Shenzhen Co. v. Yao Shun Group Int'l Ltd,
[1998] 1 H.K.C. 451(C.F.I) (H.K.) (annulling where tribunal issued award on the merits on the
same day as party submitted because party did not have opportunity to present substantive case).
109. BORN, supra note 79, at 2588; Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex Int'l, Inc. v.
Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/11 33 (Dec. 1, 2010).
110. See, e.g., UNIF. ARBITRATION AcTr § 15, 7 U.L.A 35 (2000); see Holtzmann, supra note
104, at 19; KURKELA, supra note 107, at 184-85.
111. BINDER, supra note 89, at 18.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 19.
114. Future of Arb.: Miami! Debate, supra note 36.
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States and England that utilize summary judgment, the party's right to
be heard is fairly embodied in its written pleadings alone. If each party
has a chance to present its arguments and respond to opposing argu-
ments, it may not be necessary for the parties to appear for an oral hear-
ing or for the arbitrator to move beyond those submissions.
The arbitrator has the authority, and further the obligation, to con-
sider whether hearings are necessary."I The arbitrator dictates the pro-
cedure and makes the decision as to the relevancy of evidence and
hearings."' Arbitrators are not "obliged to conduct hearings on every
issue that arises in an arbitration and in practice are afforded substantial
discretion in determining whether and how to hear the parties on particu-
lar issues or evidence."" 7
Accordingly, "where a tribunal deems a claim to be facially invalid
and incapable of being upheld no matter the volume of evidence . . ., a
tribunal's decision to dismiss that claim as patently unmeritorious
should in principle represent a valid exercise of procedural discretion
. . " .. In many cases, national courts have held that if the arbitrators
conclude that a hearing is unnecessary, they are under no obligation to
hold one."' Thus, some assert that if the parties were given a reasonable
opportunity to present their respective cases by written submissions, the
standard of procedural fairness has been sufficiently met.120
3. THE UNCERTAINTY IS CLEAR
Given the uncertainty as to the correct standard for procedural fair-
ness, especially across various jurisdictions, arbitrators understandably
hesitate in applying summary disposition. 121 The lack of express author-
ity makes arbitrators hesitant to break ground. Arbitrators are "reluctant
to rely on implicit, gap-filling or inherent powers [alone] to introduce
such a procedure,"122 with the primary fear being nullification of their
award.' 23 Thus, when faced with the decision, arbitrators most likely opt
115. KURKELA, supra note 107, at 185.
116. Id.
117. BoRN, supra note 79, at 2580.
118. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 684 (considering the national arbitration law of France).
119. See, e.g., Isidor Paiewonsky Assoc., Inc. v. Sharp Prop., Inc., 998 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1993)
(no due process violation for failing to hear a party in an arbitration when the party did not request
a hearing); Margulead Ltd v. Exide Tech. [20041 EWHC 1019 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (rejecting challenge
to award on grounds that claimant was not afforded opportunity to reply in oral submissions);
Compagnie Honeywell Bull SA v. Computacion Bull de Venezuela CA, Cour d'appel [CA]
[Court of Appeal] Paris, June 21, 1990, Rev. arb. 1991, 96 (Fr.) (noting possibility for arbitral
tribunal to dispense with hearings and reach decision on the basis of parties' written submissions).
120. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 684.
121. Gill, supra note 3, at 520.
122. King, supra note 2, at 4.
123. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 682; Collins, supra note 80, at 532.
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for a more conservative approach.12 4
c. Other Underlying Reasons for Hesitation
In addition to a fear violating procedural fairness, an arbitrator may
other reasons for being reluctant. First, custom plays a big role in inter-
national arbitration and an arbitrator may simply be more inclined to
"proceed down the well-trodden procedural path of a typical arbitra-
tion."l 25 Though empirical evidence does not exist on this point, exper-
ienced arbitrators affirm that even where a party objects, "there is a
tendency to adopt what is no doubt a 'safe' course" though it may not
"provid[e] an efficient and effective dispute resolution mechanism."126
Second, if an arbitrator decides summarily, he or she may give the
impression of taking procedural shortcuts and the parties, or at least one
of them, may ultimately feel cheated.12 7 The award may also be set
aside. Indeed, arbitrators are "human and are frequently unwilling to run
the risk of having their award set aside on the grounds of some procedu-
ral unfairness" which can bring a "risk of damage to their own reputa-
tion as arbitrators." 2 8 Also, the success of an arbitrator depends on his
or her reputation; parties will not appoint an arbitrator they believe to be
ineffective or unfair.'2 9 Claimants will not appoint an arbitrator who has
summarily disposed of disputes in the past. Arbitrators often hope that
their decisions will generate repeat business even from the losing
party13 0 and as a result are further motivated to work meticulously
toward a well-reasoned, enforceable decision. Thus, summary disposi-
tions, as risky mechanisms, can represent "professional banana skins"
for an arbitrator.13 1
Along those same lines, some arbitrators may feel that in order to
make a comprehensive decision, they must engage fully in the facts and
understand absolutely all issues before deciding the case. 13 2 As noted, an
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 520, 522.
127. Id. at 520 ("At its most basic, a successful party would feel understandably aggrieved if
the result of a tribunal taking a bold stance on early disposition of issues was to bring into
question the validity of the award.").
128. Collins, supra note 80, at 532-33.
129. John E. Beerbower, International Arbitration: Can We Realise the Potential?, 27 ARB.
INT'L 75, 79 (2011).
130. Juan Fermindez-Armesto, Partner, Armesto & Asociados (Spain), Panel on Case Mgmt. in
Int'l Arbitration: How to Guarantee Efficiency and Due Process, ICC Conference on Int'l Com.
Arb. in Latin Am. (Nov. 9, 2010).
131. Collins, supra note 80, at 533.
132. Id. at 532 ("Arbitrators, like courts, remain slow to take this step because of a natural
unwillingness to resolve a case without being seen to give both sides a full opportunity to argue
their point.").
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arbitrator will not have the same pressures of caseload and allocation of
resources as a judge might have' and large cases can involve complex
issues requiring careful consideration. 134 For good reason, the arbitrator
may not feel comfortable disposing of issues so early in the game, only
to discover later that his or her decision was in error.13 Thus, it is under-
standable that the arbitrators may require hearing oral testimony or
pleadings to safeguard against such problems.
In one ICC case, the claimant argued for summary disposition and
the respondent replied that "there should be a full consideration of the
evidence.""' The tribunal declined to issue a summary award because
the claimant could not meet the high standard, namely that the defense
was so meritless "that it should be given no credence and effectively
should be struck out."1 3  The tribunal adduced that such a matter
"should be determined in the light of all the facts and circumstances
which each party might wish to put forward."138 Accordingly, the tribu-
nal refused to grant summary disposition and allowed the matter go for-
ward to a full hearing.139
Another obstacle lies in the mechanics of the typical process. Ordi-
narily, after the tribunal is constituted and a preliminary meeting is con-
ducted, the arbitrators receive the written submissions and a hearing is
scheduled.140 As arbitrators are typically practitioners with their own
active schedules, the custom is unfortunately to postpone reading the
submissions until the last minutes.14 1 This delay leaves the tribunal with
little time to realize that a hearing is unnecessary or to determine how to
otherwise direct the parties to address only the most pertinent issues. 14 2
If arbitrators took a more proactive role by analyzing the submissions at
the outset,143 they could request further written submissions on the pri-
mary issues and make a decision more easily without a hearing. As
133. King, supra note 2, at 4.
134. Alexis Mourre, Partner, Castaldi Mourre & Partners (Fr.), Panel on Case Mgmt. in Int'l
Arbitration: How to Guarantee Efficiency and Due Process, ICC Conference on Int'l Com. Arb. in
Latin Am. (Nov. 9, 2010).
135. Gill, supra note 3, at 522.
136. Case No. 11307 of 2003, 33 Y.B. Commi. ARB. 30, Final award (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb). The
unpublished order on the Claimant's motion for a summary award was discussed and explained in
the tribunal's final award.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 33.
139. Id. "[I]n the interests of efficiency," the tribunal did, however, "identify those issues on
which it considered that it needed no further assistance from the parties," making several findings
and directing the parties to limit further arguments only to the remaining issues of uncertainty to
"save time and money at the [h]earing." Id.
140. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 8, at 364.
141. Armesto, supra note 130.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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stated above, the ICC Rules alleviate this problem by requiring a
mandatory case management conference to assess the issues
promptly.'"
Lastly, economic motivations may unfortunately play a role and
cannot be completely discarded. Arbitrators commit to perform the arbi-
tration and arrange their schedules to accommodate the time needed. 145
In most cases, arbitrators are paid more the longer the case goes and
hence it is not "necessarily in the arbitrator's own best interests" to dis-
pose of the case and end a potential income stream.14 6
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Summary disposition in international arbitration poses an attractive
alternative for parties wishing to resolve disputes efficiently and at lower
costs. When it comes to bringing a claim, however, the absolute incen-
tive to win may replace that initial the motivation for speed and effi-
ciency. 47 At that point, at least one party will prefer the opportunity to
present all evidence and address all issues thoroughly before a decision
is made. Such radical changes in the parties' purpose depending on the
circumstances make legal uniformity difficult. Thus, the source of much
uncertainty in applying summary disposition may be party autonomy
itself.
Ultimately, it falls on the arbitrator to decide what the parties
intended as to procedure. However, the arbitrator fears that by granting
summary disposition, the award will be set aside for lack of procedural
fairness. Arbitrators need more legal guidance to determine the applica-
bility of summary disposition without risking set aside of the award.14 8
A few solutions exist to cure the uncertainty. The easiest solution is
party agreement.14 9 Parties are free to dispense with an oral hearing by
mutual agreement,150 without danger of set aside."' However, after the
dispute has arisen, the parties will not likely agree on whether summary
144. ICC RULES, supra note 9, at art. 22.4.
145. Beerbower, supra note 129, at 78.
146. Id.; Gill, supra note 3, at 522; King, supra note 2, at 4 ("[U]nlike judges faced with the
pressure [of] increasing caseloads and crowded dockets, it is not necessarily in the arbitrator's
financial interest to bring an arbitration to a close at an earlier stage through a decision on
summary judgment (though surely it would be the rare arbitrator who would respond to that
incentive.")).
147. Armesto, supra note 130.
148. PAULSSON & PETROCHILOS, supra note 9, at 65 n.130.
149. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 684; Ned Beale et al., Summary Arbitration Proceedings: A
Comparison Between the English and Dutch Regimes, 26 ARB. INT'L 144, 158 (2010); see also
King, supra note 2, at 4.
150. BoRN, supra note 79, at 2580-81; Holtzmann, supra note 104, at 19.
151. Holtzmann, supra note 104, at 19.
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disposition is appropriate. As a result, an agreement before the dispute
arises, usually in drafting the contract, is the most effective option. 152
The parties may either specifically draft language in their arbitra-
tion clause or they may adopt institutional rules that recognize summary
disposition.' Where the parties have agreed on the procedure, the "tri-
bunal may (or indeed shall) determine claims on a summary or expe-
dited basis.""' In the absence of evidence of such consent, "arbitrators
will be unlikely to endorse the remedy.""55 This is especially true when
the arbitrator is from a jurisdiction that does not recognize such proce-
dures even in court.15 6 Yet, when drafting agreements, the parties' focus
is on the contract and not what procedures will apply a dispute arises in
the distant future.
Instead, institutional rules can fill this void by allowing summary
disposition. When parties adopt the rules, the procedure comes with
it.157 Institutional rules must compromise civil and common law proce-
dures so institutions may not be amenable to favoring summary disposi-
tion where most civilian countries do not apply it.' Institutions need to
address these issues internally before a result may be reached.
If not in the rules, institutions could provide greater encouragement
to the arbitrators for summary disposition of a case where appropriate. 159
For instance, institutions could specifically require arbitrators, or even
parties, to consider whether legal merit exists before proceeding further.
Such a rule does not dramatically change arbitral procedure, but forces
arbitrators at least to consider the merits and it reinforces their authority
to consider disposition. Arbitrators would be more comfortable applying
a procedure if it is built into their role. Such a rule would also address
the concerns of the users by encouraging arbitrators to step out of the
customarily lengthy procedure.
Juridical power should also cede more authority to the arbitrator.160
Extensive judicial review can invalidate the arbitrators' authority to
manage the procedure.
These solutions involve mere reforms in thought, whether on the
part of the parties, the courts, or the institutions. Summary disposition is
152. BORN, supra note 79, at 2581.
153. See id.
154. Beale, supra note 149, at 143-44.
155. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 684.
156. Id.
157. King, supra note 2, at 4.
158. Id. at 1; Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 667; Gill, supra note 3, at 524.
159. Gill, supra note 3, at 524 (applying the same idea to early disposition of specific claims).
160. Mourre, supra note 134; see also Gill, supra note 3, at 524.
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not only a valuable tool in case management, but it also provides a relief
from the prison of endless, meritless arbitration. With these simple
reforms, perhaps the only way out is not necessarily through.
